Abstract

Abstract Several countries outside the European Union consider adopting its solvency regulation for their insurance industries. However, Solvency I and (to a lesser extent) Solvency II were found to run the risk of inducing more rather than less risk-taking by insurers (Zweifel, Peter. 2014. “Solvency Regulation of Insurers: A Regulatory Failure?” Journal of Insurance Issues 37 (2): 135–157.). Companies are led to neglect parameters that link them to developments in the capital market when determining their endogenous perceived efficiency frontier (EPEF), causing it to become steeper. Given homothetic risk preferences, senior management is predicted to opt for increased rather than reduced volatility. By way of contrast, if modeled after Basel III for banks, planned Solvency III will ask insurers to take developments in the capital market into account in their formulation of business strategies designed to ensure solvency (Principle 5 of Basel III). In addition, the stipulated decrease in their leverage ratio is shown to reduce the slope of the EPEF for insurers with little solvency capital. Contrary to its predecessors, Solvency III is therefore predicted to make insurers take on less risk, which argues for its for adoption beyond the European Union if properly implemented.

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