Plan rationality 1

Abstract

An important idea in practical philosophy is that there are norms of rationality that apply to our intentions. These include norms of synchronic consistency and coherence and, arguably, a norm of stability over time. I highlight the role of intentions in our planning agency: intentions are plan states; our practical thinking is framed by our prior, partial plans and is guided by our at least implicit acceptance of these norms. These general patterns of thought normally have many practical benefits for human agents. But is it quite generally true that violation of these norms in a particular case is a rational breakdown? Some think that idea is a myth. Some see these norms as riding piggy-back on analogous norms of belief rationality. And some see the acceptance of these norms as inescapable. I see these norms as tracking conditions of a planning agent’s self-governance. This helps support norms of intention consistency and coherence, and it helps explain why certain kinds of shuffling over time, and giving into temptation, involve a rational breakdown. These explanations involve appeal to our end of self-governance. And I argue that our web of these norms together with our end of self-governance is a rationally stable reflective equilibrium. But, as I see it, this end is nevertheless not inescapable for agency. This poses the question whether it suffices to ground these norms in part in such a contingent but rationally stable reflective equilibrium.