Abstract
T he People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been introducing capable new ships, submarines, and weapons over the past fifteen years. Building and sustaining such a modern navy capable of conducting a “modern war under high-tech informationalized conditions” is a very expensive proposition. This modernization effort strongly suggests that Beijing—a leadership that is not schooled in maritime affairs—believes that the strategic interests of the state can be secured only with a robust naval force. This new strategy is a historic departure from the strategic traditions of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This essay explores the drivers behind changes in force posture, size, and capabilities of the PLAN, examines the history leading to China’s current naval capabilities, and closes by postulating that China will undertake yet another round of change in naval strategy.
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