Abstract
Grant-free random access is an emerging technology for providing massive connectivity for 5G massive machine-type communications (mMTC), where non-orthogonal pilot sequences are used to simultaneously detect active users and estimate channels. However, grant-free 5G IoT networks are vulnerable to pilot contamination attacks (PCA), where the attacker can send the same pilots as legitimate IoT users to harm the active user detection and channel estimation. To defend against this attack, in this article, we propose a physical-layer countermeasure based on the channel virtual representation (CVR). CVR can emphasize the unique characteristics of mmWave channels that are sensitive to the location of the sender. This can be utilized to counter PCA no matter if the attacker's pilots are superimposed to that of the victim or not. Based on this observation, to achieve an efficient PCA detection, a single-hidden-layer multiple measurement (SHMM) Siamese network is employed. This solution tackles the challenges of channel randomness and massive connectivity in mMTC IoT networks, and supports small sample learning. Simulation results evaluate and confirm the effectiveness of the proposed detection scheme under various scenarios. The detection accuracy can approach 99% with 128 antennas at the receiver and reach above 95% even with only 50 training samples.
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More From: IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
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