Abstract
The imposition of ex ante taxes on expected spilled oil, in addition to ex post payments for damages under tort liability, would foster economic efficiency. This paper begins the analysis of the joint approach with the case in which Pigouvian taxes are used exclusively. A model is developed in which the volume of spilled oil causing environmental damage is reduced, first by spill prevention expenditures by shippers and then by clean-up expenditures by the government. The efficient Pigouvian tax on expected spilled oil equals marginal environmental damage which equals the net marginal cost of prevention which equals marginal clean-up cost.
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