Picturing Hegel: An Illustrated Guide to Hegel’s Encyclopaedia Logic (review)

Abstract

Reviewed by: Picturing Hegel: An Illustrated Guide to Hegel’s Encyclopaedia Logic James A. Dunson III Julie E. Maybee. Picturing Hegel: An Illustrated Guide to Hegel’s Encyclopaedia Logic. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009. Pp. xxvii + 639. Paper, $56.95. If Hegel were alive to read an illustrated guide to his Encyclopaedia Logic, he might not immediately appreciate the project. Not only did he consider “picture-thinking” deficient in comparison to conceptual thinking, but he regarded the Encyclopaedia Logic as a text suitable for German students. In her recent book, Picturing Hegel, Julie Maybee acknowledges these ironies and proceeds to guide those of us who need a little extra help in understanding Hegel’s speculative logic. What results is a significant contribution to the literature, a step-by-step commentary [End Page 536] through one of Hegel’s most underappreciated works. Using diagrams to cut through the often-difficult prose proves to be an excellent strategy. Maybee’s exquisitely detailed and admirably clear exposition makes her a suitable Virgil to guide us through the Inferno of Hegel’s logic. Maybee’s task is to show how Hegel’s logic is, actually, logical, and not, as she puts it, “A jumble of random moves from one step to the next” (xiii). She distinguishes Hegel’s speculative logic from the logic we teach nowadays by emphasizing Hegel’s concern to generate and develop the concepts he employs. That is, he is concerned not merely with the rules connecting the logical terms (i.e. syntax), but also the meanings of the terms themselves (i.e. semantics). As one might expect, these concepts are developed dialectically: two elements that are ordinarily opposed to one another are revealed to be mutually defining and interdependent. Readers already familiar with Hegel’s work will appreciate the way in which Maybee explains complicated ideas like “Actuality” and “spurious infinity.” Maybee has a talent for inventive examples, some of which she carefully carries through the entire work. Also, she has an eye for Hegel’s own examples (see, for instance, the comparison of the Absolute Idea and an old man on 580–82). One of the chief merits of her detailed account is its balanced approach. Instead of perpetuating prevalent but superficial interpretations, she explains the different senses in which something is true. For instance, she distinguishes the different meanings of idealism and shows how Hegel retains some materialist elements in his logic (302). Her knowledge of the history of philosophy helps her to put Hegel’s logic in its proper context. The asides to the Pre-Socratic philosophers and the repeated references to Kant are especially useful. Maybee’s approach to the logic, especially the way in which she frames Hegel’s project, raises interesting philosophical questions. She portrays Hegel as attempting to overcome Kant’s skepticism regarding the unity of thought and being. The question is whether reality is fundamentally accessible to reason, or whether the categories we employ to understand the world are limited to our phenomenal experience. But if Hegel’s logic is supposed to refute the Kantian “thing-in-itself,” we can ask whether this is an intelligible philosophical goal. First, Maybee points out that critics like Nietzsche would ask whether we have to be “committed to logical or conceptual necessity” (130). Perhaps Hegel exhibits a rather typical philosophical bias toward conceptual stability and even necessity. Second, any investigation into logical semantics that is biased in this way inevitably opens Pandora’s Box. Determining the meaning of logical terms is a messy business, and Hegel sometimes seems to stipulate meanings instead of genuinely deriving them. For instance, as Maybee writes, a crucial part of Hegel’s definition of existence is that something is “capable of being experienced” (204). But this simply begs the question against Kant’s “thing-in-itself,” since clearly Kant does not think it exists in this way. Third, given that Maybee points out Hegel’s anthropocentric language, we can ask whether his casual and frequent references to human experience are innocent or self-undermining. For instance, what are we to make of Hegel’s use of ethical examples to explain logical concepts like actuality, necessity, and possibility? A Kantian might...