Abstract
The aim in this chapter is to provide an intelligible conception of the notion of twofoldness that Richard Wollheim has used in his account of seeing‐in in order to describe the phenomenological character of pictorial seeing or pictorial experience. To this end, it draws on Aristotle's doctrine of the unity of matter and form in compound substances as this is expounded mainly in his Metaphysics. It then explains how Aristotle's account of this unity may give us a way to think of the complex content of a twofold act of pictorial perception, in a way that allows us to account for properties that Wollheim attributed to pictorial experience, and further, to resolve objections raised to the idea that pictorial seeing is twofold.
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