Abstract

It is a long-standing puzzle why predicates like believe embed declarative but not interrogative complements (e.g., Bill believes that/*whether Mary left) and why predicates like wonder embed interrogative but not declarative complements (e.g., Bill wonders whether/*that Mary left). This paper shows how the selectional restrictions of a range of predicates (neg-raising predicates like believe, truth-evaluating predicates like be true, inquisitive predicates like wonder, and predicates of dependency like depend on) can be derived from semantic assumptions that can be independently motivated.

Highlights

  • Certain clause-embedding predicates take both declarative and interrogative complements, as shown in (1) for know

  • P is the meaning of the clausal complement, its semantic type s, t, t is abbreviated as T, and doxwx is the doxastic state of the subject x in world w.9 (7) be certain w = λPT .λx. doxwx ∈ P

  • The selectional restrictions of clauseembedding predicates can to some extent be accounted for in terms of a type mismatch, but in the absence of independent motivation for the assumed type distinction and the type requirements of the relevant predicates, such an account remains stipulative

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Summary

Introduction

Certain clause-embedding predicates take both declarative and interrogative complements, as shown in (1) for know. As soon as we admit type-shifting, we lose part of the account of selectional restrictions This is because if we introduce an operator that adapts the type of interrogatives to that of declaratives (as in, e.g., Heim 1994), this operator would resolve the type conflict when antirogative predicates like believe take interrogative complements. In this case, we lose the account of the selectional restrictions of anti-rogatives. In the absence of independent motivation for such type distinctions, the approach is stipulative to a certain degree. An account which derives

It must be noted that such motivation is not completely absent
A uniform treatment of clausal complements
Informative and inquisitive sentences
Declarative and interrogative complements
Responsive predicates: a brief illustration
Anti-rogative predicates
Zuber’s observation: all neg-raising predicates are anti-rogative
Deriving neg-raising from an excluded-middle presupposition
A generalized EM presupposition
L-analyticity
Truth-evaluating predicates: be true and be false
Rogative predicates
Inquisitive predicates
Verbs of dependency
Empirical and methodological challenges
Empirical challenge: mixed complements
Projection operators
Reformulating the EM presupposition
A methodological note
Conclusion
On the connection between anti-rogativity and neg-raising
Presuppositional questions
Presupposition projection
Relativizing non-informativity
Full Text
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