Abstract
It is a long-standing puzzle why predicates like believe embed declarative but not interrogative complements (e.g., Bill believes that/*whether Mary left) and why predicates like wonder embed interrogative but not declarative complements (e.g., Bill wonders whether/*that Mary left). This paper shows how the selectional restrictions of a range of predicates (neg-raising predicates like believe, truth-evaluating predicates like be true, inquisitive predicates like wonder, and predicates of dependency like depend on) can be derived from semantic assumptions that can be independently motivated.
Highlights
Certain clause-embedding predicates take both declarative and interrogative complements, as shown in (1) for know
P is the meaning of the clausal complement, its semantic type s, t, t is abbreviated as T, and doxwx is the doxastic state of the subject x in world w.9 (7) be certain w = λPT .λx. doxwx ∈ P
The selectional restrictions of clauseembedding predicates can to some extent be accounted for in terms of a type mismatch, but in the absence of independent motivation for the assumed type distinction and the type requirements of the relevant predicates, such an account remains stipulative
Summary
Certain clause-embedding predicates take both declarative and interrogative complements, as shown in (1) for know. As soon as we admit type-shifting, we lose part of the account of selectional restrictions This is because if we introduce an operator that adapts the type of interrogatives to that of declaratives (as in, e.g., Heim 1994), this operator would resolve the type conflict when antirogative predicates like believe take interrogative complements. In this case, we lose the account of the selectional restrictions of anti-rogatives. In the absence of independent motivation for such type distinctions, the approach is stipulative to a certain degree. An account which derives
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