Abstract
This commentary is concerned to elucidate some views expressed by R. W. Sperry in a previous Commentary. A physicalist theory of mind is briefly expounded and defended and is compared with Sperry's views, and in passing also with some remarks by D. M. MacKay. It is necessary to distinguish two senses of the word ‘emergence’, a strong sense and a weak sense. The physicalist theory is emergentist only in the weak sense. There is some discussion as to whether Sperry should be interpreted as an emergentist in the strong sense, or only in the weak sense that is compatible with a mechanistic and physicalist ontology.
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