Physical protection system effectiveness calculation in nuclear reactor facility using EASI code: case study sabotage scenario

Abstract

Every nuclear facility must pay attention to the 3S aspect (Safety-Security-Safeguard) to prevent nuclear accidents. One element in the nuclear security aspects includes a reliable Physical Protection System (PPS), which aims to ward off security disturbances and other illegal acts, i.e., sabotage, theft, Etc. This study evaluates the PPS performance by adversary-path analysis approach using the EASI code for hypothetical nuclear reactor facility to anticipate sabotage attacks as the highest consequences scenario. We perform the probability of interruption (PI) calculation as represented by the effectiveness of the PPS. The study results show that in the PPS design, calculating the PI value using the EASI code confirms the need to pay attention in determining the MVP. The results provide feedback for the PPS designer to accept the current design or strengthen it to obtain a reliable PPS.