Abstract
Power line communication (PLC) has enabled many smart grid applications and functionalities over the past few years. Secure communications over such links however remain a crucial aspect for further development. Due to their shared nature, akin to wireless, PLC channels can benefit from many wireless-type security techniques, including physical layer security. To this end, and in contrast to existing studies, which focus on non-cooperative PLC systems, this paper considers the application of physical layer security in cooperative PLC networks in the presence of passive eavesdropping. We analyze the performance of such systems using log-normal correlated channel models considering background and impulsive noise components. Furthermore, the impact of PLC/wireless coding diversity on the system secrecy capacity is evaluated. The results include accurate mathematical expressions for providing an insight into the secrecy capacity and outage probability performance of such systems under various network scenarios.
Highlights
The rising demand for electricity, in both the domestic and industrial sectors, coupled with the need to enhance power efficiency and control made it necessary to modernize the aging electricity grid
The physical layer security is primarily characterized by the secrecy capacity metric, which is defined as the maximum transmission rate that can be achieved without leaking information to an eavesdropper [16], [17]
In order to simplify the analysis of the average secrecy capacity over the impulsive noise power line communication (PLC) channel, we consider the upper bound under the assumption that full knowledge of the noise state is available at the nodes
Summary
The rising demand for electricity, in both the domestic and industrial sectors, coupled with the need to enhance power efficiency and control made it necessary to modernize the aging electricity grid. In this paper we focus on investigating the performance of PLC physical layer security with amplifyand-forward (AF) relaying and cooperative jamming over correlated channels and provide accurate results in terms of the average secrecy capacity and outage probability. In order to simplify the analysis of the average secrecy capacity over the impulsive noise PLC channel, we consider the upper bound under the assumption that full knowledge of the noise state is available at the nodes. In this case with direct source to destination transmission, the channel capacity (in bits/sec/Hz) can be expressed by [30, eq (35)] and [35]–[38]. In order to find the average secrecy capacity Cs, we need to calculate the average destination capacity Cd and the average eavesdropper capacity Ce
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
