Physical Layer Security in Downlink of Cell-Free Massive MIMO With Imperfect CSI

Abstract

This paper investigates the threat of passive eavesdropping on downlink cell-free massive MIMO (CF-MaMIMO) systems, examining in a particular system under the effects of imperfect channel estimation. Physical layer security (PLS) techniques and power allocation algorithms are typically adopted to deteriorate the quality of eavesdropped signals. In the downlink stream, artificial noise (AN) is broadcasted simultaneously with the users’ data streams, with the aim of jamming the eavesdropper’s signal without sacrificing the quality of service (QoS). However, imperfect channel estimation results in AN leakage to legitimate users. Our work considers this condition, and the power allocation algorithms we present determine the minimum power that is needed to maintain the user’s Qos even in the presence of leaked AN. We first propose the cooperative PLS algorithm (COP), which facilitates AN broadcasting via access point (AP) cooperation. Unfortunately, this cooperation wastes some of the power used to send the AN and, in most cases, increases the computational complexity. We then present the independent PLS algorithm (IND), where the goal is to regain this power by allowing each AP to broadcast AN independently. However, to meet the feasibility criterion, this occurs at the cost of increasing the number of used antennas. This technique reduces the power allocation complexity but increases the computational complexities of the precoder design and the channel estimation process. Our results reveal that the proposed algorithms enhance the security performance of CF-MaMIMO. We evaluate such performance from numerous angles including the number of users, number of APs, QoS, beamforming, AN leakage, and channel estimation techniques.