Philosophy of religion and the reality of models for modalities

Abstract

The coming of age of the philosophical discipline called modal logic is one of the more fascinating intellectual processes to watch in our age. Not unreasonably many philosophers have great expectations as to the ulti? mate impact of this discipline on vital philosophical questions and even on theology. However, we cannot yet hope to correctly assess the probability that a rigorous modal logic will provide foundations for vital beliefs where former logical disciplines, either for want of rigour or for want of philosophical scope, have failed. H. G. Hubbeling belongs to those philosophers of religion who take an active professional interest in modal and deontic logic.1 He does so partly for purposes of clarification, thereby stressing the overall im? portance of formulating criteria of judgement. However, I believe bis interest in modal logic goes even deeper than that; vide his own mention of indebtedness to Heinrich Scholz (p. 113). And indeed, modal logic, in the wide sense of intensional logic, may well turn out to be philosophically revolutionary. But which revolution if any it will bring about, as well as how and why, are certainly open questions. It seems that in Hubbeling's thought the following assumptions jointly play a constitutive role: