Abstract
AbstractExternal pressure on Higher Education Institutes in the United Kingdom has brought the question of the extrinsic value of academic philosophy into focus. One line of research into questions about the extrinsic value of philosophy comes from the Philosophy for Children (P4C) movement. There is a large body of literature about the benefits of P4C. This paper argues that the distinctive nature of the P4C pedagogy limits the claims made by the P4C literature about the extrinsic value of philosophy to claims about the value of P4C. While this is not a problem within the P4C literature that recognises these limitations, the paper makes three claims about why it is sometimes inappropriate to extend claims from research into the value of P4C to claims about the value of non‐P4C philosophy. It argues that more research is needed to investigate the value of non‐P4C philosophy.
Highlights
As universities strive to demonstrate the relevance and value of their work, academic philosophy departments have compelling reasons to turn to literature about Philosophy for Children (P4C)
This paper argues that the distinctive nature of the P4C pedagogy limits the claims made by the P4C literature about the extrinsic value of philosophy to claims about the value of P4C
This paper explores the relationship between P4C and philosophy, concluding that the relationship is complicated to the extent that claims about the value of P4C might not be true of academic philosophy, and vice versa
Summary
Document Version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Citation for published version (Harvard): Gatley, J 2020, 'Philosophy for Children and the Extrinsic Value of Academic Philosophy', Metaphilosophy (edited by Professor Thomas Pogge, Columbia USA and ANU Australia), vol 51, no. 4, pp. 548-563. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.v51.4
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