Abstract
Too little attention has been paid, by Richard Rorty and his critics alike, to the tension between his moral and political commitments. His views of knowledge and the self have led him to insightful discussions of cruelty and humiliation, and moral commitments to tolerance and empathy, yet his politics are a version of liberalism insufficient for these moral commitments. This article explores these tensions by explicating Rorty's philosophical positions and moral commitments, examining his transition to politics and his practice of criticism, and discussing the implications of their incongruity. It concludes by identifying a number of the political implications of Rorty's insights and commitments.
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