Philosophy and the Rationalisation of Educative Action: The Example of Personal Autonomy

Abstract

In France, the philosophy of education is not accustomed to reflect on the concept of the ‘education system’. Often, the ‘humanistic’ purposes that it gives to education are far away from the real goals of a systematic education. Often also, it is confined to a critical attitude, whose constructive side is missing. Which form of philosophical practice is desirable vis-à-vis the transformations of the education systems? How to develop an at the same time normative and critical thought, which take account of the current evolutions? This is what this contribution is concerned with, using the limited example of personal autonomy. In this reply to Philippe Foray's article ‘Philosophy and the Rationalisation of Educative Action’, the author salutes Foray's call to anchor the project of articulating aims of education in the realities of contemporary education but claims that Foray's plea to re-imagine the philosophy of education is arbitrarily restricted. The notion that defending high-level directives should preoccupy educational philosophy is rejected. Far from characterising educational philosophy prior to mass, state-managed educational systems, the author argues, a more faithful rendering of the history of the field demonstrates that the responsibility of stating education's ends was largely imposed on educational philosophy by the rationalisation of educational systems itself. In conclusion, contemporary practical ethics is advanced as a model for a more expansive conception of educational philosophy's potential contribution to educational research, policy and practice.