Philosophy and Power in Averroës

Abstract

The Maghreb Review, Vol. 41, 2, 2016 © The Maghreb Review 2016 This publication is printed on longlife paper PHILOSOPHY AND POWER IN AVERROËS SHAWN WELNAK* INTRODUCTION Dr. Colmo’s, ‘Wisdom and Power in Averroës’ Commentary on Plato’s Republic’ attempts a pioneering interpretation of the medieval philosopher’s account of the relationship between theory and practice. As he says, in contrast to that of the Greeks, ‘Averroës’ understanding of theoretical knowledge allows for a new understanding of the relationship between wisdom and power’ (308). 1 For Colmo’s Averroës, ‘theoretical knowledge does indeed involve will and choice’, while for his Plato and Aristotle it does not. What precisely Averroës’ new understanding is, however, remains largely mysterious in his essay. Perhaps it would be more judicious to say that Colmo aims to provide us not with this new Averroëan understanding, but rather with some indications as to why we might wish to begin a new inquiry into its status. Colmo’s essay might thus be seen as a propaedeutic work calling for further investigation. We shall examine here five aspects of the argument Colmo uses to promote his new investigation. Ultimately, I believe Colmo’s misunderstanding of the ancients’ view of the relationship between theory and practice leads him to regard the views of the ancients and of Averroës as being divergent. In the absence of perfect wisdom, theory and practice work together in the ancients, though not from the perspective of either perfect wisdom or the ethical virtues. This is precisely the teaching of Averroës. I. THE QUESTION OF REALIZATION The roots of Colmo’s project seem to arise from Muhsin Mahdi, about whom Colmo makes the following claim: Averroës’ illustrious predecessor was Alfarabi. Muhsin Mahdi says that ‘Alfarabi’s central concern’ is ‘the question of realization’. He also writes, ‘The ruler-prophet or the ruler-philosopher is the human being who offers the solution to the question of realization of the best regime’. Mahdi says that it is ‘worth developing’ the question: ‘What is the peculiar Farabian synthesis – if one can call it that – of the Platonic radicalism whose perfection is expressed by the city in speech, and of a Quranic radicalism whose perfection is expressed in a city to be constructed by the faithful here on earth?’ (309, my emphasis) So what exactly is the question here? Colmo takes it to mean that Alfarabi and * Long Island University 1 All references are to ‘Wisdom and Power’ unless otherwise noted. 326 SHAWN WELNAK his student Averroës2 were concerned with putting their wisdom to work in the political sphere, whereby philosophical theory would henceforth supposedly guide political practice. That is to say, Alfarbi and Averroës intended, in Colmo’s interpretation, to achieve something that was thought to be impossible by the ancients—no more merely imaginary republics and principalities. There is another way, however, in which to understand the question that Mahdi raises here. This understanding is arrived at by first noting that we may not even have a right to call Alfarabi’s ‘synthesis’ a synthesis at all, for Mahdi presents it hypothetically (see ‘if one can call it that’). Secondly, Mahdi’s particular Farabian question of realization seems to be related to a problem unknown to the ancients, insofar as Platonic radicalism must confront Quranic radicalism. The Platonic city merely to be prayed for must be reconciled with the fact that Muhammad has answered our prayers. Kallipolis may therefore now be said to exist. The question of realization is thus the question of the relationship between Socrates’ city and Muhammad’s city. How can we, as pious Muslims, grasp the relationship between these two cities? The Farabian answer, which Averroës accepts: their rulers are philosopher-prophets. If Kallipolis has been created on earth, Muhammad was not only a prophet, but of necessity a philosopher as well. This, it seems to me, is the issue of realization that Alfarabi and Averroës have before them as their central concern. Whether this is a synthesis in anything but name is as unclear as Muhammad’s status as a philosopher. II. PROBLEM ONE Colmo’s fundamental worries about Averro...