Abstract
As a distinctive voice in the current philosophy of technology, postphenomenology elucidates various ways of how technologies “shape” both the world (or objectivity) and humans (or subjectivity) in it. Distancing itself from more speculative approaches, postphenomenology advocates the so-called empirical turn in philosophy of technology: It focuses on diverse effects of particular technologies instead of speculating on the essence of technology and its general impact. Critics of postphenomenology argue that by turning to particularities and emphasizing that technologies are always open to different uses and interpretations, postphenomenology becomes unable to realize how profoundly technology determines our being in the world. Seeking to evaluate the postphenomenological (in)ability to radically reflect on the human being conditioned by technology, I discuss the two most pertinent criticisms of postphenomenology: an “existential” one by Robert C. Scharff and an “ontological” one by Jochem Zwier, Vincent Blok, and Pieter Lemmens. Assessing the ontological alternative, I point to incapacity of Heidegger’s concept of Enframing to do justice to material technologies. Simultaneously, I acknowledge the necessity of speculating on (the concept of) technology as transcending concrete technologies. Such speculating would be instrumental in reviving Ihde’s idea of non-neutrality of technology in its full philosophical potency.
Highlights
Postphenomenology is both a well-established and vigorously evolving philosophical movement, initially outlined by Don Ihde, the author of “the first full-scale philosophical analysis of technology by an American” (Durbin, 2006, 95–96)
Whereas Scharff exposes postphenomenology as conditioned by a positivist worldview, the authors rehabilitating Heidegger understand the approach of postphenomenology as historically situated but as “technically mediated” in an ontological sense, i.e., as “enframed.” I have already indicated that the connection between the concept of Enframing and an intuitive or “natural” meaning of technology is disputable—I will return to this problem
Must we resuscitate program three to realize the philosophical potency of postphenomenology? Not really
Summary
Postphenomenology is both a well-established and vigorously evolving philosophical movement, initially outlined by Don Ihde, the author of “the first full-scale philosophical analysis of technology by an American” (Durbin, 2006, 95–96). The method of postphenomenology includes empirical work “as a basis for philosophical reflection” (Rosenberger & Verbeek, 2015, 31) It bases its conclusions on case studies, i.e., on analyzing concrete empirical inter-relations and interactions between humans and technologies. Scharff and an “ontological” one by Jochem Zwier, Vincent Blok, and Pieter Lemmens Both criticisms demonstrate that, to put it very roughly, postphenomenology, when focusing on empirically observable human-technology relations, evades the question of the general impact of technology. I believe that the critics rightly point to the postphenomenological inability to address a “large-scale pattern” connected with and conditioned by technology Whereas they suggest alternative approach(es), I would like to show that postphenomenology can reformulate its program, or, more precisely, change its current modus operandi to be able to realize its own program. Ihde is an adventurous thinker, and one who surely would not want to be tied up by a strictly defined methodology, yet I believe that a methodological reflection might be instrumental in fulfilling the intentions of postphenomenology
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
