Philosophical Posthumanism

Abstract

This is a timely book by Francesca Ferrando, which shows the origin, both in historic and philosophic senses, of posthumanism, which has gained much currency in recent times. The reason for its wide acceptance can be sought in the questions and debates posthumanism raises to address some of the fundamental needs of our times, as it engages with some of the major philosophic ideas of the last two centuries and applies them to shed light on contemporary problems. Ferrando approaches posthumanism from many angles and places it in the historic development of recent times, while also addressing some of the Greek and Roman ideas that have shaped Western civilization. But posthumanism, as she argues, is not a Eurocentric movement; Ferrando shows how and why this is the case, while acknowledging that one meaning of posthumanism can be construed within the Western context. The book is comprehensive in terms of subjects it addresses, including technology, feminism, dualism, the meaning of “human,” human versus nonhuman, speciesism, environmentalism, transhumanism, alterity, technologies of the self, cyborgs, robots, and epigenetics. Furthermore, it critically presents ideas from many recent philosophers from Nietzsche to Foucault that have shaped posthumanism, and the key figures of the posthumanist movement, such as Katherine Hayles and Donna Haraway. The book is structured in three parts with short chapters in each. What follows below is a summary of the chapters.In Part I, Chapter 1, “Premises,” Ferrando attempts to locate the posthuman within the need for many “posts” and then defines Posthumanism as an onto-epistemological and ethical approach (22), which is an attempt to overcome dualisms, anthropomorphisms, and obsolete hierarchies. Ferrando argues that posthumanism exceeds the particular tradition of Western academic thought. In my view, more needs to be said on how and why posthumanism is not a Western project, while humanism itself is a European phenomenon; Ferrando will deal with this issue later in the book. The chapter ends with a note on the epistemic shift where the self is construed as plural and relational, unlike the way modernity’s humanism construes it (23). Chapter 2 shows the origin of the term “posthumanism” and discusses each of its three movements: critical, cultural, and philosophical. Ferrando links posthumanism to postmodernism, while exposing the hegemonic structures embedded in humanism. After tracing the origin of the term “posthuman” to the literary theorist Ihab Hasan and his works, Ferrando presents two movements of posthumanism, critical and cultural posthumanism. The former was developed by Katherine Hayles and the latter by Donna Haraway. However, many movements share the umbrella term “posthuman,” and this is where much confusion arises. In the following chapter, Ferrando sheds light on these confusions, especially regarding the use of the term “posthuman.” While for transhumanists the “posthuman” “may refer to the next phase of (human) evolution,” for the posthumanists it may mean “the symbolic move of going beyond the human” (27). As Ferrando engages with transhumanists such as Max More and Natasha Vita-More, she shows how transhumanism and posthumanism differ in their approaches to time, a difference that is closely related to the conception of the “posthuman.” Transhumanism, with its faith in the “progress” of the Enlightenment, embraces a linear conception of time, whereas there are trends in posthumanism that question this linear conception and moves toward a cyclical understanding of time.Chapters 4 through 6 explore the origin and the philosophical foundation of transhumanism. While the use of the term may be as old as Dante, transhumanism as a cultural movement can be traced back to Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881–1955) and Julian Huxley (1887–1975). Both of these authors envisioned a new type of human being, “a new historic transcendence,” per Ferrando. But Huxley’s transhumanism suffers from anthropocentricism, and Ferrando demonstrates how Huxley gives humans a special role and place in the universe (30). Related to this human exceptionalism is the genesis of transhumanist thought in the Enlightenment. All transhumanist movements share the ideal of scientific and technological progress. As Ferrando notes, transhumanists do not take a critical approach to the problems of modern scientific rationality, including those of the Enlightenment (32). Because transhumanism has not overcome dualism and anthropocentricism, Ferrando argues, it remains within the framework of humanism and can be called “ultrahumanism” (33). As Ferrando comments, transhumanism does not engage critically with the values of the Enlightenment or with modernity in general. Chapter 7 is a thoughtful exposure of the overestimation of technology in transhumanism, which, in my view, is an extension of Occidental logocentricity. Ferrando shows how, for transhumanists, technology has replaced old religions and also how short-sighted transhumanism is regarding human suffering; much of this stems from the belief in Enlightenment’s progress and its time signature, which is linear time (I myself dealt with this subject in my contribution to Nietzsche and Transhumanism).Chapter 8 demonstrates why technology is a crucial issue for posthumanism and discusses technogenesis and the problems of technology by way of Heidegger. Here Ferrando highlights two key notions, poiesis and episteme, in relation to techne and discusses the problems of modern technology, which Heidegger diagnoses in its modus operandi, namely Enframing. Subjugation of nature, measurability and availability of all things, the loss of poiesis—all of these are aspects of Enframing. Heidegger traces the root of modern technology to the Enlightenment period (while Greek and Medieval metaphysics are also in the background), which is the foundation for transhumanism. This is one area where transhumanism and posthumanism diverge (42). In addition to Heidegger’s essay, Ferrando mentions two things in combatting the “dangers” of technology: feminism and “technology of the self.” The former has been crucial in overcoming some of the rigid biases of the past, while the latter, as formulated by Foucault, shows different forms of technological revealing (44) and, in addition, different forms of making of the self.The distinction between anti-humanism and posthumanism is the subject of the following chapter, Chapter 9. While showing the proximity of anti-humanism to posthumanism, especially in the decentering of the privileged position of the human, Ferrando highlights their differences as well, especially by way of Nietzsche’s notion of the overhuman. Here Ferrando’s criticism of Nietzsche’s overhuman needs to be examined. First, she laments the hierarchical symbolism in this notion, but hierarchies prevail in every human formation. Posthumanism, by positing different values, is also introducing a new form of hierarchy. The fundamental question to post here is what kinds of hierarchies are healthy for all human beings and for all beings. Second, Ferrando suggests an “inherent anthropomorphism” (50) in Nietzsche’s overhuman as she quotes a passage from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, where the overhuman is placed over the beast, but overall there is a deep respect for the animal and animality in Nietzsche’s thought and in this specific work. As for the death of God, although I agree with the way Ferrando explains it in broad terms, I disagree with her on the way she shows the connection between the death of God and posthumanism. Contrary to her claim, posthumanism is possible only within the frame of this epoch-making event and announcement, the death of God. In fact, movements such as posthumanism, in my view, are offshoots of this significant turning point. This does not, however, mean that posthumanism overlaps with the death of God fully and completely. The latter is a far broader and far more outreaching event than any of its offshoots such as postmodernity and posthumanism. And we cannot take the “death” in the death of God as opposed to life, but rather as a gradual/graded cultural transformation, and Nietzsche was already postdualistic when he announced the death of God in The Gay Science.Chapter 10 is a neat organization and presentation of core ideas of Posthumanism. In addition to other key figures, Ferrando introduces the ideas of Braidotti, Vattimo, and Pepperell and their contributions to posthumanism. By way of Braidotti, Ferrando emphasizes the posthuman departure from the life/death separation of the old metaphysical order; in Pepperell she highlights “post-centricism” and “post-exclusion” in posthumanism. And, finally, through Vattimo’s philosophy, she shows how the “new” and the “center” are deconstructed by posthumanism. Centers in posthumanism are “mutable, nomadic, ephemeral” (57). In this chapter, one also finds an interesting claim about Heidegger’s ideas on humanism. Ferrando claims that Heidegger still carries on the vestiges of humanism when he grants humans the privileged position of “shepherd of Being” (57), while destroying the metaphysics of humanism. The interlude at the end of Part I summarizes the issues discussed so far and is a synopsis of the central ideas of posthumanism.Part Two of the book investigates every aspect of the term “posthuman” in its three components, starting with the hyphen. The hyphen serves for mediation, stands for upcoming possibilities, can be a middle term and function as a unifying term; all of these point to the fact that the hyphen stands for relationality (Chapter 11). Ferrando also reflects on the meaning of “post,” which in Latin means “behind” and “after,” as it suggests a continuity, a discontinuity, and a transcendence (66), in the sense of exceeding and going beyond. Ferrando, in Chapter 12, moves on to the discussion of the term “human” in the feminist literature of de Beauvoir, Irigaray, and Butler. Several things stand out here: first, human, like gender, should be understood as a verb, not as a noun. Another one deals with alterity or the category of the Other. Here Ferrando sides with Irigaray’s position, where “the woman is not essentialized in her differences from the man, but it is posed as an absence” (71), rather than de Beauvoir’s notion of alterity. This chapter sums up the three major feminist positions on alterity. Chapter 13 presents the concept of anthropological machine; there is an extensive discussion of the human/machine relationship by way of Agamben and the use of “man” in this context. The philosophical problem of human versus inhuman is also brought up here. Ferrando rightly stresses how sensitive these boundaries are and how rigid categories and dualisms hinder praxis and, further, complicate human relations.Chapter 14 focuses on what “humanizing” and “dehumanizing” could mean. Discussing the fate of Africans and Natives and their genocides in the Americas, Ferrando demonstrates how history shows different perspectives and definitions of “human.” The Valladolid debate of 1550–1551, which she mentions, is a point of interest here. Dehumanization starts with an already conceived notion of the human, where humans are classified and categorized according to such notions. The following chapter, Chapter 15, presents “technologies of the self” by way of Foucault and how they can be reconstrued as posthumanist resources. They are resources to be used by individuals for their self-transformation. Ferrando emphasizes how the challenges in accessing these resources can be overcome so that they are available to all rather than just the few (83). Here Ferrando mentions Bakhtin’s subversive trends; to her list we can also add the wisdom of active transgression that one finds in literature from Sade to Camus and Foucault in cultivating forms of resistance, which can have life-affirming effects on one’s self and others. As Ferrando stresses the significance of the shift from the human as a noun to the human as a verb, in Chapter 16, she discusses the possible outcomes of “the process of humanizing” (86). While addressing the challenges in the process of humanizing, she shows how the experience of alterity can be dealt with by way of Levinas’s ideas, especially from Totality and Infinity. She also indicates how posthumanism differs from Levinas on the subject of alterity, while agreeing with his opposition against “reduction of the other to the Same” (85). Ferrando also mentions different types of epiphanies in the encounter with the Other and comes back to the question of the human, as she poses the question as to whom and how humans became “human.” She proposes to examine the term archaeologically and then examines its dictionary definition.Chapter 17 investigates the etymology of the word “human” in its Latin form and within the context of Roman culture. Since ancient Romans had a close connection to ancient Greece and its ideals of “paideia,” Ferrando moves on to exploring such Greek notions as “anthropos” and “logos,” while explaining further how “human” is understood by various Roman authors from Plautus to Cicero. Despite the evolution of the understanding of “human” in this period, Cicero, who was highly influential on Renaissance humanism, still remained within the traditional world, as “his common ‘humanitas’ did not challenge the hegemonic, hierarchical socio-political configuration” (92) of his times. Chapter 18 presents a discussion of the biological meaning of the “human,” as it brings in Linnaeus and his taxonomy. Rooted in Greco-Roman and Christian metaphysics, Linnaeus’s taxonomy was nonetheless a radical shift in the eighteenth century, as it brought humans together with other living beings. But, as Ferrando claims, Linnaeus’s system was Eurocentric and his assumed scientific objectivity still remains to be a European perspective. In this context, she lists the biases in Linnaeus. Discussion of the mammal and its origin also shows Linnaeus’s other biases stemming from his Zeitgeist. Interlude 2 sums up the highpoints of Part II and makes a smooth transition to Part III, which deals with the theoretical and pragmatic issues of the postanthropomorphic shift to the posthuman.The first chapter of Part III, Chapter 19, demonstrates how and why anthropocentricisms and the Anthropocene are problems and also how they are linked. Ferrando also shows different aspects of the anthropomorphic world-order via Parikka and Haraway, which are the Anthropocene, the Capitalocene, the Plantationocene, and the Chthulucene (105). Ferrando also pursues the question of the postanthropomorphic paradigm shift and what it means to inhabit the earth. Furthermore, she revisits the Gaia theory, how the model of “‘intra-action” could serve the new paradigm, and how humans can relearn how to inhabit the earth. This chapter ends with a note and many questions on death and the relationship between life and death and between the living and the dying. The following chapter, Chapter 20, expands on this topic, as it looks into issues of “bios” and “zoe” and animate versus inanimate. The relevance of animation is studied in relation to robots and their status. Here Ferrando suggests that the nondualistic paradigm of posthumanism will ease the anxiety of AI or robot takeover. If we were to adopt symbiotic models, we would see a coexistence or fusion between human and AI, rather than a hegemony. The chapter ends with an interesting question as to whether robots are alive or not. On the other hand, Chapter 21 recognizes the complexity of “artificial life” and the new status of robots. But as Ferrando notes, posthumanism does not accept the new technocentricism, or any centricism in general. She revisits the question of technology and rightly observes that “the notion of technological development should not be approached in a univocal manner... but they shall be regarded in a comprehensive way” (119).The question of species and biological life is the subject of Chapter 22. After examining why this question is relevant, Ferrando asks if the notion of “species” is already speciesist. In this discussion, we see the problems of advanced capitalism and how some humans benefit from technological and AI progress, while the rest and nonhumans still suffer from dualistic, anthropocentric paradigms of the past. Although Ferrando does not mention it here, what explains such mixed sociopolitical and cultural trends is nihilism, which is pervasive in our age. Chapter 23 moves on to addressing the question of evolution: How does evolution work? The question is crucial, as Ferrando states, because of the importance of the future of humanity. She then moves on to discussing Lamarck, Darwin, and epigenetics. The increasing use of biotechnologies and genetic engineering is altering the human species as we know it. What the posthumanities (for the meaning of this word, see page 125) will be remains a central concern to posthumanism. Epigenetics is also crucial to posthumanism, because it helps posthumans to overcome the nature/culture divide. Chapter 24 expands on posthuman bioethics and presents CRISPR, a new tool in genetic engineering, within the context of eugenics, understood in both its negative and positive meanings. Ferrando brings both bioconservatives such as Habermas and bioliberals into this debate and shows the problems in the distinction between therapy and enhancement. The latter becomes the main subject for Chapter 25. After surveying three issues in human enhancement, namely, “the cultural specificity of values, the complexity of genes, and the sociopolitical implications of genetic discrimination,” (133) and presenting “precautionary” and “proactionary” principles, Ferrando assesses what the position of posthumanism may be on human enhancement. She states that posthumanism is not opposed to enhancement, but it must be considered in its broader context and in its impact not only on human beings but also on other species and other beings of our planet. While considering all human beings, enhancement must also consider nonhumans as well. “[A] posthuman approach calls for a bioethical standing that exceeds the realm of human exceptionalism” (136). Well said; I am in agreement with the way Ferrando expounded the posthuman position on enhancement. I would have also added “effects” to this discussion, by way of Spinoza and Nietzsche: what are those affects that enhancers and enhancements produce on all beings, human and nonhuman? In this chapter, Ferrando reconciles the precautionary and proactionary approaches and shows different approaches, among posthumanists, to human enhancement.Cognitive autopoiesis is the subject matter of Chapter 26. Ferrando brings it up because it was part of the posthuman literature and debates; it simply means self-creation and was developed by Katherine Hayles in the 1990s. On the other hand, Donna Haraway opposes her notion of “sympoiesis” against autopoiesis, arguing that we always create or make with others. Nothing is self-made (141). Whether they are autopoietic or sympoietic, how does cognitive science look at these processes? Ferrando shows the problems of ontological assumptions in cognitive sciences where there is not much regard for animal life, especially in animal experimentation. Autopoietic and sympoietic approaches sit on top of ontological assumptions, which must be questioned. Here Ferrando exposes the problem of cognitive anthropocentricism, which has deep roots in Western civilization and can be traced back to logocentric trends one finds in Greek philosophy. Chapter 27 presents some core philosophical trends that shape posthumanist thought, such as perspectivism (as nonhuman perspectives are also included). Ferrando is dismissive of relativism (and rightly so). She further discusses questions of fact versus truth, affinity and identity, strategic essentialism and embodiment. For the last, she mentions different types of embodiment, alternative types of embodiment as in “psychological, spiritual, and religious domains” (155), and also dream embodiment. All of these are signs of going beyond body/mind dualism and seeing them in their integrated forms.Chapter 28 presents recent philosophical movements that overlap with posthumanism: new materialism, agential realism, vital materialism (connected to vitalism, which is discussed in this chapter), and object-oriented ontology. The ontology of philosophical posthumanism is the content of Chapter 29, which includes what matter is, string theory, monism versus pluralism, quantum physics and its ontological assumption, and multiverses. The last is the main subject for Chapter 30, the last chapter of the book. The chapter is split into three parts: multiverses in science, multiverses in philosophy, and the posthuman multiverse. For the first, Ferrando presents four levels of multiverse by way of Tegmark. She then examines whether the underlying assumptions of multiverse are consistent with posthumanism, as she looks into all four levels and their assumptions. In her examination, she detects dualistic structures that stem from humanism. For multiverses in philosophy, Ferrando shows the origin of the idea in philosophy (Al-Ghazali, Averroes, Al-Razi, Duns Scotus, Leibniz, and William James) and then its recent formulation in David Lewis who, according to Ferrando, does not solve the problems of the scientific version of multiverse. As an alternative, she proposes the experiment of a posthuman multiverse.In conclusion, Ferrando’s book, Philosophical Posthumanism, not only exposes the basic elements and ideas of philosophical posthumanism, but also deals with its other close and not-so-close cousins, including antihumanism and transhumanism. It traces the origin of posthumanism in many recent schools of philosophy from Nietzsche to Foucault, while discussing its formulation by recent thinkers such as Katherine Hayles. On one hand, the book engages critically with the problems of humanism, modernity, and Western metaphysics; on the other hand, it shows how, through our overcomings, we can be posthuman. This can happen, as Ferrando argues, through a perspectival shift, as humans move to situated perspectivism, pluralism, and diversity, undo speciesism and reconnect with other species and rethink our physis, and confront technology so as to bring techne and poiesis together again (187). Ferrando ends her book on an upbeat note while not bypassing or glossing over some of the major problems of our age. The book is engaging and thought-provoking for beginners and scholars of posthumanism alike. It is well written, with a nice flow; I recommend it highly to anyone who would like to embark on a journey in this shift to posthumanism.