Philosophical analysis and structural linguistics

Abstract

In the course of this century philosophical analysis has increasingly turned from the material to the formal mode. In both their meta- philosophical pronouncements and their first-hand philosophical practice analytical philosophers have been increasingly moving away from talking in terms of the description, dissection, or analysis of extra-linguistic ideas, concepts, or meanings, and more and more tending to talk in terms of uses of words, the ‘grammar’ of our language, or the rules governing our use of linguistic expressions. It has not escaped the notice of friend and foe alike that, as this latter style becomes firmly entrenched, the enterprise of analytical philosophy comes to bear a striking similarity to such traditional linguistic disciplines as lexicography and grammar. This observation has evoked a variety of reactions. Critics of this form of analytic philosophy have taken these similarities to be a reflection of the triviality or lack of philosophical significance of such researches, while the practitioners of this style have often striven to distinguish their work from ‘mere lexicography’ or ‘school grammar’. On the other hand, some philosophers of late, particularly those heavily influenced by the linguistic work of Zelig Harris and Noam Chomsky, have hailed contemporary structural linguistics as a saviour which will lead analytical philosophy out of the wilderness into the promised land of scientific precision and certitude.