Phenomenology, Saudi Arabia, and an argument for the standardization of clinical ethics consultation

Abram Brummett,Ruaim Muaygil

doi:10.1186/s13010-021-00099-6

Abstract

BackgroundThe purpose of this study is to make a philosophical argument against the phenomenological critique of standardization in clinical ethics. We used the context of clinical ethics in Saudi Arabia to demonstrate the importance of credentialing clinical ethicists.MethodsPhilosophical methods of argumentation and conceptual analysis were used.ResultsWe found the phenomenological critique of standardization to be flawed because it relies on a series of false dichotomies.ConclusionsWe concluded that the phenomenological framing of the credentialing debate relies upon two extreme views to be navigated between, not chosen among, in the credentialing of clinical ethicists.

Highlights

In their critique of standardization in clinical ethics consultation (CEC), Bishop et al frame the debate as one between pro-credentialing procedural and anticredentialing phenomenological views [11,12,13].1 The procedural view they describe is committed to quantifying the core aspects of CEC, developing a standardized process for performing CEC, and deploying abstract categories and concepts in consultations in order to transform the consultant into a confident, capable professional
Critique: a framing of false dichotomies We find that framing the credentialing debate as one between extreme procedural vs phenomenological views relies upon a series of false dichotomies
We describe the current state of bioethics in Saudi Arabia, where one of the authors works as a clinical ethics consultant at a major medical center

Summary

Introduction

In their critique of standardization in clinical ethics consultation (CEC), Bishop et al frame the debate as one between pro-credentialing procedural and anticredentialing phenomenological views [11,12,13].1 The procedural view they describe is committed to quantifying the core aspects of CEC, developing a standardized process for performing CEC, and deploying abstract categories and concepts in consultations in order to transform the consultant into a confident, capable professional. In their critique of standardization in clinical ethics consultation (CEC), Bishop et al frame the debate as one between pro-credentialing procedural and anticredentialing phenomenological views [11,12,13].1 The procedural view they describe is committed to quantifying the core aspects of CEC, developing a standardized process for performing CEC, and deploying abstract categories and concepts in consultations in order to transform the consultant into a confident, capable professional. For Foucault, the medical gaze refers to the way of seeing that the trained physician brings to her interaction with the patient- a way of seeing that reduces the patient to a kind of matter in motion, a collection of pumps, tubes, chemicals, and lab results, but no longer a person Describing this process, Bishop et al write, “the subject carries with him into every place that he goes the set of categories that he deploys. Conclusions: We concluded that the phenomenological framing of the credentialing debate relies upon two extreme views to be navigated between, not chosen among, in the credentialing of clinical ethicists.

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Conclusion