Phenomenology and Human Rights

Abstract

Abstract In this article, I present the phenomenological tradition as a new grounding for human rights as universal rights. The hypothesis defended is to conciliate Husserl’s phenomenological method, and Reinach’s a priori law in order to offer a new grounding to human rights. Combining Husserl and Reinach’s ideas, I propose to expand the comprehension of a priori. It would be present as eidos of each object, and I name it as material a priori; it also be present in the eidetic relations and I name it as formal a priori. Yet the object would have an essence, a necessary content, a material a priori, and necessary states of affairs, necessary relations and connections, a formal a priori. Reinach, in The A priori Foundations of the Civil Law, describes eidetic relations, such as the relation between promise, claim, and obligation. I propose three eidetic universalities to ground law; these are what I will call human rights. I also face a few difficulties presented by DuBois and De Vecchi derived from the amoral approach of a priori laws. Then, I highlight the difference between this proposition and Albert’s. Finally, I defend the proposition that a priori laws are beyond natural and positive laws.