Phenomenological justification of psychoanalysis

Abstract

The article is a preliminary sketch of the phenomenological description of the experience of psychoanalysis, in order to phenomenologically justify the fundamental psychoanalytic concepts and phenomena. The phase structure experience of the psychoanalysis is considered, namely: analyst’s anxiety, psychoanalytic reduction, psychoanalytic analysis and interpretation. In addition, the first part of the article is devoted to the main aspects of logical-phenomenological critique of psychoanalysis. First of all, the critique of the associative, mechanistic, speculative theory of psychoanalytic practice that its phenomenological inadequacy leads to a gap between psychoanalytic theory and practice. This fact is especially emphasized in the phenomenological psychology of Arthur Kronfeld and the Daseinanalysis of Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss. Hence, the article is an attempt to outline another way to bridge this gap, by phenomenological justification of the experience of psychoanalysis.