Abstract
AbstractThis chapter defends the premise that Mary gains knowledge when released from the black-and-white room from an objection presented by Dennett and Mandik. They argue that the intuition driving that premise derives from the mistaken assumption that knowing what it is like to see in color requires having color experiences. But that intuition does not derive from that assumption. To suppose it does is to miss the key role of a priori deducibility in the knowledge argument. The epistemic gap has the form one cannot learn Q in way Wd (viz., by deduction from physical information), not the only way to learn Q is in way We (viz., by having relevant experiences).
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