Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: The “Bad Basis” Counterexamples

Abstract

Phenomenal conservatism (PC) is plausible, especially if it is restricted to perceptual seemings, but so are the apparent counterexamples involving cognitively penetrated perceptual seemings—the “bad basis” counterexamples. This paper explores the options for proponents of PC. I consider three options: 1) the defeater approach, which takes the purported counterexamples to be cases in which the prima facie proviso is unsatisfied because the subject has a defeater; 2) the “distinguish the epistemic statuses” approach, which takes the examples to refute principles resembling PC but which concern some epistemic status other than the “favored” status of reasonableness to believe; and 3) the receptivity approach, which modifies PC by restricting it to “receptive” seemings, where a seeming’s receptivity is understood in terms its lacking a certain sort of basis, what I will call a “quasi-inferential” one. I agree with Markie and Siegel that PC stands refuted, even when restricted to perceptual seemings. However, I will argue that its prospects brighten when it is restricted to receptive seemings.