Phenomenal Belief, Phenomenal Concepts, and Phenomenal Properties in a Two-Dimensional Framework

Abstract

Abstract Peter, who is looking at the cloudless sky during the day, and Eve, who is looking at a painting of Yves Klein, have something in common. They both have a visual experience that has a common feature with respect to the color sensation. They are both having a blue sensation. The property of having a blue sensation is a paradigmatic example of phenomenal properties. Phenomenal properties arc often conceived of as properties of inner events or processes. I prefer to think of phenomenal properties as properties of sentient beings. A person who never had color experiences may have a concept of the property of having blue experiences (acquired by talking with sighted people or by reading books) but she does not have a phenomenal concept of having blue experiences. Phenomenal concepts are acquired on the basis of one’s own experiences of the relevant kind. Phenomenal concepts of having color experiences of particular kinds are acquired on the basis of one’s own color experiences. The question of how to account for the relation between phenomenal concepts and phenomenal properties is at the center of the current debate about the ontological status of consciousness.