Persuasion within Small Deliberative Groups: A Randomized Field Experiment on Fiscal Policy Discussion

Abstract

We evaluate the dynamics of persuasion within small groups using a large scale randomized deliberative experiment. In particular, we examine whether persuasion in this context is driven by the composition of small groups to which participants were randomly assigned. In these discussions focusing on U.S. fiscal policy, ideological persuasion occurs but does not tend to be polarizing, a result that is consistent with normative deliberative goals of cross-cutting discussion and inconsistent with the 'law' of polarization identified in small group research. In addition, the results demonstrate the presence of persuasion that is outside of ideological constraints, a form of persuasion that participants themselves tend to associate with informed discussion. The results show that small group dynamics depend heavily on the context in which discussion occurs and that deliberative institutions can ameliorate many of the pathologies that are often attributed to small group discussion.