Abstract

We examined how perceived causal expertise affects the processing of causal persuasive arguments. In Study 1, participants received strong or weak causal arguments from a content-area expert who was high or low in causal expertise. Participants in the high causal expertise condition processed the causal arguments carefully: they were more persuaded by strong compared to weak causal arguments. In Study 2, participants received a high or low causal confidence prime and then read a message from a source who was high or low in content-area expertise. The message contained strong or weak, causal or non-causal arguments. Participants who received both the causal confidence prime and the high content-area expertise information processed the causal arguments carefully: they were more persuaded by strong compared to weak causal arguments. These findings demonstrate that causal and content-area expertise can increase motivation to attend to causal arguments. Implications for the persuasion literature are discussed.

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