Perspective Taking Failures in the Valuation of Physical and Mental States

Abstract

Accurately inferring the values and preferences of others is crucial for successful social interactions. Nevertheless, without direct access to others’ minds, perspective taking errors are common. Across four studies we demonstrate a systematic perspective-taking failure: people value their minds more than their bodies, but fail to realize others share those values, often believing that others value their bodies more than their minds. The bias manifests across a variety of domains and measures, from severity of injuries to preferences for new abilities to assessments of how much of one’s identity resides in one’s body. This self-other preference reversal was diminished — but still present — when participants thought of a close other and deliberately attended to their own bodies and another’s mind. This attenuation suggests that the availability of others’ mental attributes helps to reduce this perspective-taking error. This bias has implications for the ways in which we create social policy, judge others’ actions, make choices on behalf of others, and allocate resources to the physically and mentally ill.