Perspectival objectivity

Abstract

Brukner (2018) proposes a no-go theorem for observer-independent facts. A possible consequence of the theorem is that there can be no absolute facts about the world, only facts relative to an observer. However, admitting such observer dependency runs the risk of licensing pernicious anthropocentrism in our account of reality, thereby precluding the possibility of objectivity in scientific inquiry, which would surely count as a mark against taking Brukner's result too seriously at face value. In this paper I argue that, properly understood, observer-dependent reality does not preclude objectivity, and I claim that this idea has philosophical pedigree, too. Working through the examples of colour perception and causality, I identify a perfectly reasonable notion of 'perspectival objectivity'. I argue that such a view would not be out of place in Bohr's philosophy of quantum theory, and claim that this notion of perspectival objectivity can be appropriated as part of an understanding of quantum phenomena to take the sting out of the possibility of observer-dependent reality, and permitting the objectivity required for scientific inquiry.