Abstract
AbstractDespite its potential implications for the objectivity of scientific knowledge, the claim that “scientific instruments are perspectival” has received little critical attention. I show that this claim is best understood as highlighting the dependence of instruments on different perspectives. When closely analyzed, instead of constituting a novel epistemic challenge, this dependence can be exploited to mount novel strategies for resolving two old epistemic problems: conceptual relativism and theory-ladeness. The novel content of this article consists in articulating and developing these strategies by introducing two fine-grained notions of perspectives as the key units of analysis: “broad perspectives” and “narrow perspectives.”
Highlights
In recent years, perspectival realism has emerged as a new view in philosophy of science, opposed to the objective view
I show that far from constituting a novel epistemic challenge, the dependence of instruments on broad perspectives, when closely analysed, provides instead the means to mount a novel response to the old epistemic challenge of conceptual relativism
By drawing on two brief case studies – the history of the cloud chamber (Galison 1997) and of stellar classifications (Hoffleit 1991) – it is established that scientific instruments and their outputs can cut across both broad perspectives and changing objectivity standards
Summary
If any, the import of scientific perspectivism is in relation to scientific instruments, and whether in this context it brings about either new epistemic challenges or new solutions to such challenges, two steps are necessary. It is necessary to understand what kind of ‘perspectives’ are relevant to instruments. It is necessary to understand in what ways scientific instruments depend on relevant perspectives and what epistemic consequences may result from such dependence
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