Persons, Morality, and Tenselessness

Abstract

As is well-known, philosophers have historically accepted one of two incompatible views of time. The central dispute concerns status of tense. Realists about tense believe that notions of past, present, and future are objective and ontological in that they would apply to objects and events even were no conscious or language-using agents in world. On this view, neither world of past nor world of future is there (or anywhere) in any literal sense. What was occurring and did exist is no longer occurring and no longer exists, and what will occur and will exist is not yet occurring and does not yet exist. In short, are no nonpresent existents, although many things have existed and many other things will exist. Opposed to realistic account of tense is tenseless theory of time. According to tenseless view, all temporal objects and events are stretched out in a tenseless array such that all of them past, present, and future are on an equal footing with respect to existence. Hence, all past and future objects and events exist in same way that things exist. They do not presently exist, since to exist presently is to exist at moment of time; but they do, nevertheless, exist as well as existents. The resulting picture involves a spatialization of time, for on this view existence at a particular moment of time is analogous to existence at a particular location in space. Now and the present are used to indicate temporal location of something relative to itself or to something else, and imply no special metaphysical status on part of objects or events to which they refer. Therefore, on this tenseless account of time, notions of past, and future are subjective and epistemic, not objective and ontological. There are many arguments which purport to decide between these two theories of time. However, a powerful consideration against tenseless view seems to have been overlooked in recent discussions. For, as I hope to