Abstract
We examine the role of hiring networks stemming from information asymmetries or co-worker complementarities in determining the personnel-economic geography of large US law firms. We show, using the Ellison and Glaeser (1997) index of concentration, that large law firms tend to be concentrated with regard to the law schools they hire from. There is substantial across-firm heterogeneity in law-school concentration. Oce-level concentration is substantially greater than firm-level concentration. Oce-level concentration is greater for associates than it is for partners, which may be consistent with various theories of employer learning. It seems that around two-fifths of observed oce-level concentration can be explained by simple measures of oce-school geographic proximity and firm-school reputation matches. We also find a strong relation between partner concentration (at the
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