Personalization in attributing responsibility for national problems to the president

Abstract

The studies reported test two hypotheses concerning the conditions under which citizens will attribute more of the responsibility for political events to the president. The first hypothesis, derived from Heider's theory of defensive attribution, is that citizens who feel more threatened by national political problems will judge the president to be more responsible for those problems. The second hypothesis is that those who lack knowledge about political events will attribute more of the responsibility for such events to the president as a cognitive simplifying strategy. These hypotheses were tested in three studies—two surveys on inflation and unemployment and an experiment on nuclear war. The results of all three studies support Heider's defensive attribution hypothesis. Each suggests that those more threatened by a national political problem will hold the president more responsible for that problem. The survey results also suggest that such attributions of responsibility have an influence upon voting behavior, with those who hold the incumbent responsible for national economic problems more likely to vote for the other presidential candidates. The results of the three studies are equally clear in the case of knowledge effects. In none of the studies do those who lack political knowledge attribute increased responsibility for national problems to the president. In addition, there is no evidence of an interaction between threat and knowledge. Instead, threat-induced increases in attributions of responsibility to the president are found to occur to an equal degree at all levels of political knowledge.