Personales Selbsterleben, Wissen-wie-es-ist und Intersubjektivität: Eine kritische Betrachtung von L. A. Pauls Konzeption der ,lived experience‘

Abstract

In her recently published monography Transformative Experience L.A. Paul has defended a concept of ‘lived experience’ that is meant to account for the transformative effects of major life decisions. According to Paul, “humans vary so much and so deeply, that even small differences (contextually speaking) in experiences between people can prevent us from knowing what it is like to be a different type of person” (Paul 2014, 7). In this article I will argue that Paul's account results from a problematic conception of lived experience that cannot account for the intersubjective dimensions of personal experience, i.e. for the fact that our lived experience is intrinsically tied to our relationships with others. These, however, are of central import to our ethical practice, e. g. in raising awareness for the particular experiences and needs of others. After providing some introductory remarks concerning the concept of ‘lived experience’ in section I, the aim of section II is to critically investigate Paul's conception of ‘lived experience’ and to show that her approach not only rests on highly contestable assumptions but yields several unplausible consequences. Given these problems, I will suggest an alternative account of lived experience in section III. I will argue that mental phenomena like pain, sadness or desperation have characteristic manifestations in linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour which are part of the concept of a particular mental phenomenon. It is due to this that we possess intersubjective criteria that enable us to ascribe mental properties to ourselves as well as to others. The alternative account can thereby avoid the problems that are concomitant with Paul's approach. It can nevertheless take into account the distinct perspective of first person ‘lived experiences’.