Personal Autonomy and Shared-Value in Bioethics

Abstract

Although the principle of “respect for personal autonomy” is largely conceptualized against the background of values of societies that espouse individual liberty, not all societies in the world place a high premium on the place of the individual person. This chapter examines the value of autonomy in bioethics and determines whether other values, such as “communal responsibility” dominant in African settings, are equally valuable in the context of healthcare and health research. It uses elderly care, as a case example, to explore the subtleties of personal autonomy and determine its valuableness in African contexts. In African settings, the care of elderly persons is binding on families and considered a responsibility of their communities. Elderly persons enjoy the privilege of being cared for, and families and communities are responsible for providing care. While some individual persons may choose not to provide the care and some elderly persons may reject care offered, the question remains whether the refusal is morally acceptable or if rejection removes the moral responsibility to provide similar care to others. This chapter will examine the value and place of autonomy in African socio-cultural contexts, barring its already presumed universal value in bioethics.KeywordsAutonomyValuePersonhoodCommunal responsibilityShared-valueIndividual libertyBioethicsInformed consent