Abstract
Questions about the identity of a person over time are among the few basic philosophical questions which seem of real importance to people at large and crucial to finding a satisfactory response to various ethical dilemmas. Some see a certain view of personal identity as part of the foundations of ordinary moral thought and wish to defend it on those grounds, while others, who agree that it is thus fundamental, think that, since it is false, we need radically to rethink our moral ideas. Of late such discussions have centred around the work of Derek Parfit, as presented in Reasons and Persons (Clarendon Press, Oxford, I984). This paper makes some suggestions about the trans-temporal identity both of persons and of other things, partly for the light I believe they throw on the claims advanced in that book. They represent something of a middle path between Parfit's position and that of those philosophers who oppose anything which they and Parfit agree in thinking of as a reductionist approach to this.' We might divide views about the identity of persons across time into three types, according as to which of these statements they come nearest to accepting:
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
