Abstract
I offer four different arguments for an interpretation of Lockean persons as modes rather than substances. First, it provides the most plausible account of the relation between persons and organisms (or immaterial thinking substances) available to Locke. Second, Locke cannot justify the methodology of 2.27 unless he holds that persons are modes. Third, the role that the idea of a person plays in Locke's ethical and political theory requires persons to be modes. Finally, the mode interpretation provides a satisfactory way of responding to one common objection to Locke's larger philosophical picture: that his account of personal identity is incompatible with his anti-essentialism.
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