Persistence in power of long-lived parties

Abstract

This paper presents a dynamic model of electoral competition in which parties are long-lived organizations. In each period, the incumbent chooses between two policies. The competitive policy yields a greater reelection probability, but absent electoral effects, the incumbent would prefer the accommodative policy. The analysis reveals that parties’ incentives to win reelection feed on themselves via a dynamic strategic complementarity effect: the incumbent’s incentives to prioritize reelection today increase if it expects its rival will prioritize reelection once in power. This complementarity effect is more relevant when competitiveness harms the opposition electorally- and policy-wise. As a result of this effect, checks and balances disincentivize parties’ competitiveness not only under divided governments but also when government is unified. Lastly, competitiveness is disincentivized by political turnover, party discipline, and parties’ impatience. The model applies both to settings of “virtuous” and “perverse” accountability, in which the competitive policy is socially better or worse, respectively.