PERSIAN BARGAINING IS INAPPROPRIATE

Abstract

(By Aleksei Khazbiyev. Ekspert, Feb. 22, 2016, p. 28. Complete text:) The Russian military-industrial complex's hopes to secure billions in contracts with Iran are fading fast. before Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan flew to Moscow [see Current Digest, Vol. 68, No. 7, p. 16], Tehran indicated in no uncertain terms that bargaining with Russia was not going well and that no quick results should be expected. For instance, in response to our proposal regarding T-90 tanks, Ahmad Reza Pourdastan, commanding officer of the Iranian Army's Ground Forces, stated unequivocally that his country does not need this hardware. And this despite the fact that only two months ago, he had talked about the T-90's high combat capabilities and even dispatched a group of experts to Russia to assess those capabilities. Even though the General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces stated that the T-90 will be given preferences in procurement contracts, the procurement of these tanks is being ruled out at present, considering [our] country's potential. We want to manufacture our own armored vehicles, and are in fact doing so successfully, Pourdastan said. This issue was also unexpectedly addressed by minister Dehghan. According to him, Iran already developed a new tank model, the Karrar, which may not be superior to the T-90, but is definitely every bit as good. ... Such behavior ahead of an official visit would usually be considered at odds with the diplomatic code of conduct, but not for Iran. The country believes - not without reason - that Russia failed to act like a partner toward Iran at least twice. The first time was in the late 1990s, when following agreements with the US, we decided to freeze military-technical cooperation with Iran (but only on paper). The second time was in 2010, when Russia voted in favor of sanctions against Iran at the UN Security Council and even tightened them unilaterally, refusing to deliver S-300 missile defense systems [see Current Digest, Vol. 62, No. 22, pp. 12 - 14]. So it seems that any talk of ethics is inappropriate here. ... Nevertheless, Tehran attempted to rectify this embarrassing situation. Kioumars Heidari, deputy commander of the Iranian Army's Ground Forces, stated that Tehran has not yet abandoned the idea of buying Russian T-90s, but is counting on the transfer of their manufacturing technology. This is a mandatory condition, and no transaction is possible without it. In response to this, Uralvagonzavod [Urals Train Car Plant] deputy general director Aleksei Zharich immediately announced [the company's] willingness to set up licensed T-90 production in Iran. However, no specific agreements have been reached on the matter. What's more, not a single serious arms contract been signed as a result of Dehghan's talks [last week] with Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin. Granted, the Iranians said that discussions have begun on agreements worth $10 billion and that contracts are still to come. In particular, Iran plans to procure two S-400 [antiaircraft missile system] installations, large consignments of Su-30 fighter jets and Mi-17 helicopters, Bastion missile systems and diesel submarines. Importantly, the Iranians want almost all of these systems to be manufactured in their country. And with regard to the Su-30, [the Iranians] also want to implement joint R&D projects to develop its Iranian modification. In other words, Iran is seeking to achieve the same level of military-technical cooperation [with Russia] that Russia achieved with India. However, unlike India, Iran is not prepared to pay now: It wants to get all weapons on credit. Needless to say, no offensive arms contacts are possible until 2020, when all sanctions on Iran are lifted. Nevertheless, the Iranians could have already bought our defense systems - for example, the S-400. However, this not happened. Nor Iran bought our SSJ-100 civilian airplanes. Iran's Civil Aviation Organization head Mohammad Khodakarami said Tehran is not interested. All of this stands in stark contrast to Iran's relations with Europe. For example, the Iranians have already procured 118 airplanes worth $25 billion from Airbus without any preconditions. And they have signed a contract with ATR to buy 40 regional jet liners that are competitors of the SSJ. Iran has already signed a total of over $50 billion in various agreements with European Union countries. And it had enough funds for all of that. Obviously, in this situation, we must stand firm in our relations with the Islamic Republic and maybe even reevaluate them completely.