Persia's foreign policy between the two Herat crises, 1831–56

Abstract

A number of events in the early nineteenth century led to a radical change in Persia's foreign policy, from a pro-British to a pro-Russian orientation. First, the Second Russo-Persian war of 1826-28 was unfavourable to Persia and led to the loss of the Transcaucasian territories. Second, Russia's impressive success in the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29 gave Russia a strong foothold in the Western Transcaucasus and strengthened her influence in the Balkans. The third factor was the fantastic success of Russian diplomacy at Unkiar Skelessi in 1833. Russia's representatives at the Shah's court, and first and foremost A. S. Griboyedov,' were using every means to strengthen the anti-British tendencies evident in the policy of Abbas Mirza, de facto ruler of Persia and heir to the throne. That unintelligent though energetic statesman and military leader wanted military and political revenge at any cost, to save his country's face after the recent defeat and humiliation. It was understandable that after Russia's victories both on the battlefield and in diplomatic negotiations, he and his people regarded Russia as the most powerful state in Europe. Russia's attitude towards its co-religionists in the Transcaucasus and the Slav and Christian populations of the Balkan Peninsula demonstrated that Russia had at all times been true to her obligatiQns; she was a faithful ally and staunch supporter. Russia's representatives at the Shah's court were constantly stressing these points, and by comparison Britain's behaviour looked to say the least unattractive. Abbas was impressed by Russia's autocratic regime which he thought gave her considerable advantages over Britain when it came to solving problems of foreign policy: 'The government of Russia is not dependent on a parliament nor on public opinion'.2 Guided by these considerations, in 1830-31 Abbas Mirza made his choice and adopted a pronounced antiBritish position. The latest Anglo-Persian agreement (the Tehran agreement) of 25 November 1814 was, in his opinion, dead. His view met with the approval of no less a personage than Lord Palmerston, who had written to his closest collaborator, Hobhouse, in 1836: