Abstract

T THE source of greatest perplexity in ethics, as in metaphysics, is the constant necessity for deciding between antitheses. The fundamental problems which demand solution inevitably present themselves as dilemmas, and conclusions fall toward one of two extremes, supposed to be mutually exclusive and together exhaustive of possibilities. Just as one must approach reality as monist or pluralist, and knowledge as idealist or realist, one is invited to ethics either as Platonic realist or as psychological subjectivist. There is, alas, for the majority of philosophers, no bifocal vision. The way of antithesis is the way of truth. It is not the purpose of this essay to suggest any adequate synthesis for traditionally opposed theories of value, but rather to indicate a certain neglected interdependence and similarity between them. The strength of extremes is that they magnify differences and ignore similarities, thereby sacrificing relatedness to clarity. But an examination of a sharp realism and a sharp subjectivism shows that the hostility in this instance is often more nominal than real. In the Ethics of Professor Nicolai Hartmann, and in the Moral Economy and the General Theory of Value of Professor Ralph Barton Perry, contemporary thought has at last a detailed and comprehensive expression of the two antithetical positions. Yet a comparison of the two gives three startling results: First, many apparent differences resolve themselves into contrasts of terminology rather than of meaning. Second, each of the theories is marred by a failure to meet a fundamental aspect of the value-situation which can be satisfied only on the opposing view. Third, each of the theories at some one point is led to borrow silently, even unconsciously,

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