Abstract
AbstractRecently, self‐fulfilling cases, that is, ones in which an agent's believing a proposition guarantees its truth, have been offered as counterexamples to uniqueness. According to uniqueness, at most one doxastic attitude is epistemically rational given the evidence. I argue that self‐fulfilling cases are not counterexamples to uniqueness because belief‐formation is not governed by epistemic rationality in such cases. Specifically, this is because epistemic rationality is not just about forming true beliefs, but about tracking mind‐independent truths. In support of the latter claim, I offer three arguments, namely that self‐fulfilling and non‐self‐fulfilling cases differ in their phenomenology, in the norms that guide belief formation, and in the way they relate to the evidence.
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