Peri-Watchdog: Hunting for hidden botnets in the periphery of online social networks

Abstract

In order to evade detection of ever-improving defense techniques, modern botnet masters are constantly looking for new communication platforms for delivering C&C (Command and Control) information. Attracting their attention is the emergence of online social networks such as Twitter, as the information dissemination mechanism provided by these networks can naturally be exploited for spreading botnet C&C information, and the enormous amount of normal communications co-existing in these networks makes it a daunting task to tease out botnet C&C messages.Against this backdrop, we explore graph-theoretic techniques that aid effective monitoring of potential botnet activities in large open online social networks. Our work is based on extensive analysis of a Twitter dataset that contains more than 40million users and 1.4billion following relationships, and mine patterns from the Twitter network structure that can be leveraged for improving efficiency of botnet monitoring. Our analysis reveals that the static Twitter topology contains a small-sized core sugraph, after removing which, the Twitter network breaks down into small connected components, each of which can be handily monitored for potential botnet activities. Based on this observation, we propose a method called Peri-Watchdog, which computes the core of a large online social network and derives the set of nodes that are likely to pass botnet C&C information in the periphery of online social network. We analyze the time complexity of Peri-Watchdog under its normal operations. We further apply Peri-Watchdog on the Twitter graph injected with synthetic botnet structures and investigate the effectiveness of Peri-Watchdog in detecting potential C&C information from these botnets.To verify whether patterns observed from the static Twitter graph are common to other online social networks, we analyze another online social network dataset, BrightKite, which contains evolution of social graphs formed by its users in half a year. We show not only that there exists a similarly relatively small core in the BrightKite network, but also this core remains stable over the course of BrightKite evolution. We also find that to accommodate the dynamic growth of BrightKite, the core has to be updated about every 18days under a constrained monitoring capacity.