Performance regimes in sport policy: exploring consequences, vulnerabilities and politics

Abstract

The performance measurement regimes instituted by central government sport agencies have both intended and unintended effects in relation to their network partners. The purpose of this article is to investigate the actions and interpretations of national sport organizations (NSOs) in relation to a performance regime. Drawing from data in New Zealand, two broad categories of institutional effects are identified and discussed. The first category of effects relates to the tendency for performance measurement and monitoring to reinforce the delineation/demarcation between elite and community sport due to the relative clarity of the former’s measures, and the institutionalization of ‘cream-skimming’ at national and sub-national levels. The second category of effects surrounds the apparent paradoxes and vulnerabilities of performance measurement that include the demand for indicators to ‘mushroom’ and the development of ‘gaming’ behaviours. This study highlights the tenuousness of performance measurement schemes as a feature of ‘good management’ as well as their ultimate contribution towards (or disruption of) ‘good policy’.