Abstract
We examine the relationship between the optimal incentive contract and the firm's decision to fire a manager for poor performance. We first derive some theoretical results using a simple principal-agent model, and then examine the empirical evidence on the incidence of forced turnover among CEOs with different compensation contracts. We find that CEOs with steeper compensation contracts (i.e., with greater incentives) are more likely to be fired following poor firm performance. Logit estimations indicate that among poorly performing firms, a CEO receiving incentives at the 60th percentile level are roughly 10% more likely to be fired than a CEO with incentives at the 40th percentile. The results are robust to various performance and incentive measures. We also find that the performance pressure was greater in the latter half (1997-99) of the sample than in the first (1993-96). Increased firing pressure might have been one of the factors contributing to the accounting shenanigans of the late 1990's.
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