Abstract
Global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing poses a significant threat to maritime logistics. Many maritime electronic devices rely on GNSS time, positioning, and speed for safe vessel operation. In this study, inertial measurement unit (IMU) and Doppler velocity log (DVL) devices, which are important in the event of GNSS spoofing or outage, are considered in conventional navigation. A velocity integration method using IMU and DVL in terms of dead-reckoning is investigated in this study. GNSS has been widely used for ship navigation, but IMU, DVL, or combined IMU and DVL navigation have received little attention. Military-grade sensors are very expensive and generally cannot be utilized in smaller vessels. Therefore, this study focuses on the use of consumer-grade sensors. First, the performance of a micro electromechanical system (MEMS)-based yaw rate angle with DVL was evaluated using 60 min of raw data for a 50 m-long ship located in Tokyo Bay. Second, the performance of an IMU-MEMS using three gyroscopes and three accelerometers with DVL was evaluated using the same dataset. A gyrocompass, which is equipped on the ship, is used as a heading reference. The results proved that both methods could achieve less than 1 km horizontal error in 60 min.
Highlights
The experiment assumed that while sailing in Tokyo Bay, interference was detected near Tokyo Haneda Airport, and the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) direction before the interference was set as the initial direction of the inertial measurement unit (IMU) direction
The IMU azimuth, Doppler velocity log (DVL) velocity, and IMU acceleration with the Kalman filter (KF) were compared with GNSS-derived velocity/direction information and real-time kinematic (RTK)-GNSS positions to evaluate the accuracy
The data were obtained by installing an IMU and GNSS receiver on the “Shiojimaru.” In addition, the DVL output of the ship was recorded
Summary
Satellite positioning plays an important role in modern navigation systems. Among the existing advanced navigation sensors, only satellite navigation can provide a ship’s absolute position relative to the geocentric coordinate system [1]. The number of ships lost at sea due to global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing is increasing, according to reports. According to Dryad Global, a maritime security intelligence agency, GNSS interference incidents in the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf have become more frequent. GNSS interference introduces positioning errors and affects the normal operation of a number of ship’s navigation aids, causing crews to make wrong decisions and posing significant marine security risks [2]. Malicious interference usually occurs near the coast, increasing the risk of vessel grounding
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