Abstract
The loosely coupled integration of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) and Inertial Navigation System (INS) have been widely used to improve the accuracy, robustness and continuity of navigation services. However, the integration systems possibly affected by spoofing attacks, since integration algorithms without spoofing detection would feed autonomous INSs with incorrect compensations from the spoofed GNSSs. This paper theoretically analyzes and tests the performances of GNSS/INS loosely coupled integration systems with the classical position fusion and position/velocity fusion under typical meaconing (MEAC) and lift-of-aligned (LOA) spoofing attacks. Results show that the compensations of Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) errors significantly increase under spoofing attacks. The compensations refer to the physical features of IMUs and their unreasonable increments likely result from the spoofing-induced inconsistency of INS and GNSS measurements. Specially, under MEAC attacks, the IMU error compensations in both the position-fusion-based system and position/velocity-fusion-based system increase obviously. Under LOA attacks, the unreasonable compensation increments are found from the position/velocity-fusion-based integration system. Then a detection method based on IMU error compensations is tested and the results show that, for the position/velocity-fusion-based integration system, it can detect both MEAC and LOA attacks with high probability using the IMU error compensations.
Highlights
The vulnerability of Global Satellite Navigation Systems (GNSSs) to various intentional and non-intentional radio frequency interferences is an obstacle of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) applications [1,2]
Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System (GPS/INS) loosely coupled integration systems with position fusion and position/velocity fusion are tested under these two spoofing attacks
Position fusion and position/velocity fusion are tested under these two spoofing attacks
Summary
The vulnerability of Global Satellite Navigation Systems (GNSSs) to various intentional and non-intentional radio frequency interferences is an obstacle of GNSS applications [1,2]. As the Kalman Filter innovations in tightly GNSS/INS integration systems show unreasonable fluctuations under spoofing environments, they can be used as an alternative detection method [22,23,24]. The consistency of attitudes resolved by INS and GNSS is able to detect spoofing attacks, due to the difference from the spoofing heading to the actual heading [25,26] These methods are difficultly realized in low-cost GNSS chips that support neither pseudorange outputs nor dual/multiple antenna inputs. For these black-box receivers, there is no access to signal processing-based interference detections. We try to find a method to detect spoofing attacks based on the GNSS/INS loosely coupled integration system without additional hardware, information or special requirements.
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