Abstract
AbstractThis chapter explores what the perfectionist conception of justice might imply in terms of laws and public policies. While the discussion is tentative and does not seek to make a definitive case for any particular legislative or policy programme, the author suggests that moral excellence could be promoted through laws and policies designed to support the institution of friendship; that intellectual excellence could be promoted through informative and educational public broadcasting; and that artistic excellence could be promoted through the operation of publicly funded arts institutions and agencies. This chapter also addresses the concern that these laws and policies can already be justified on familiar liberal grounds such as freedom, equality and fairness, and so the perfectionist conception of justice turns out to be practically indistinguishable from leading non-perfectionist conceptions of justice such as those of Rawls and Dworkin.
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