Perceptual fluency, auditory generation, and metamemory: Analyzing the perceptual fluency hypothesis in the auditory modality.

Memorability studies have revealed a limitation in our ability to accurately judge which images are memorable. Conversely, metacognitive research suggests that individuals can utilize cues to reliably assess their memory performance. Here, we investigated two important stimulus cues potentially underlying subjective memorability, and their relation to actual memory performance. Participants encoded 200 real-world object images while providing Judgements of Learning (JOLs), in which they estimated the likelihood of remembering each image. Subsequently, they completed an old/new memory recognition test on these stimuli. All stimuli were priorly rated by an independent group of participants for their perceived meaningfulness and visual complexity. Results indicated that participants' metacognitive judgements exhibited a relatively good resolution, allowing them to distinguish well-remembered from less-remembered images. Furthermore, analyses conducted at the image level demonstrated that JOLs significantly predicted memory performance, with the meaningfulness of the images emerging as a crucial factor associated with JOLs of both participants and their actual memory performance. The visual complexity factor was correlated only with the actual memory performance. Collectively, these findings suggest that memory performance is closely associated with the meaning of objects. Critically, individuals possess a subjective sense of images' memorability, which is at least partially mediated by perceived meaningfulness.

There is much controversy on the psychological mechanism of Judgements of learning (JOLs). Cue-utilization approach proposed by Koriat considers that most of the cues can be grouped into three classes: intrinsic, extrinsic, and mnemonic. Both intrinsic and extrinsic cues may affect JOLs directly, and they may also exert their effect indirectly through their influence on any of the internal, mnemonic cues. The theory can explain successfully the bases or implications of JOLs from a broad perspective, but it can not state the way how individuals make JOLs. Meanwhile, some researchers proposed encoding fluency and retrieval fluency to explain and examine their effects on JOLs during leaning process, which are helpful for researchers to probe into the psychological mechanism of JOLs deeply. In addition, some research focused on children with learning disabilities (LD) found that, compared to their normal peers, lower metacognitive accuracy was one of their important characteristics. However, most of research was descriptive, and can not provide suitable targeted direction for educational practices. According to these, the present study would examine the different effects of different fluency cues on children with LD to find their specific influencial patterns. Twenty children with LD and twenty normal children selected from a common primary school (Mean age = 10.5 years) participated in the experiment to make item-by-item JOLs for paired words presented using a PC. This study examined the effects of encoding fluency (inferred from self-paced study time) and retrieval fluency (inferred from the latency of pre-JOL retrieval) on JOLs, wihch were elicited either immediately after study or after a short or longer delay. Results showed that: (1) Children with LD mainly utilized retrieval fluency to make JOL across immediate and delay conditions. However, for normal children, it showed some distinction between encoding and retrieval fluency as potential cues for JOL across immediate and delay conditions. (2)As a kind of JOLs cues, encoding fluency was more valid than retrieval fluency with immediate JOLs condition, whereas retrieval fluency validity increased with JOLs delay. Based on the above all results, normal children's JOLs are based on the flexible and adaptive utilization of different mnemonic cues according to their relative validity in predicting their final recall, whereas the cues children's with LD JOLs based on are not comparably flexible.

Hindsight bias describes people’s tendency to overestimate how accurately they have predicted an event’s outcome after obtaining knowledge about it. Outcome knowledge has been shown to influence various forms of judgments, but it is unclear whether outcome knowledge also produces a hindsight bias on Judgments of Learning (JOLs). Three experiments tested whether people overestimated the accuracy of their memory predictions after obtaining knowledge about their actual memory performance. In all experiments, participants studied 60 cue-target word pairs, made a JOL for each word pair, and tried to recall the targets in a cued-recall test. In Experiments 1a and 1b, people recollected their original JOLs after attempting to recall each target, that is, after they obtained outcome knowledge for all items. In Experiments 2 and 3, people recollected their original JOLs in a separate phase after attempting to recall half the targets so that they had outcome knowledge for some but not all items. In all experiments, recollected JOLs were closer to actual memory performance than original JOLs for items with outcome knowledge only. Thus, outcome knowledge produced a hindsight bias on JOLs. Our results demonstrate that people overestimate the accuracy of their memory predictions in hindsight.

The experience of fluency while learning might bias students’ metacognitive judgments of learning (JOLs) and impair the efficacy of their study behaviors. In the present experiments, we examined whether perceptual fluency affects JOLs (1) when people only experience one level of fluency, (2) when item relatedness is also available as a cue, and (3) across study-test trials. Participants studied a list of paired associates over two study-test trials and made JOLs for each item after studying it. We varied the perceptual fluency of the memory materials by making the font easy (fluent) or difficult (disfluent) to read. We also varied whether we manipulated the perceptual fluency of the items between-participants or within-participants and whether other memory factors—item relatedness and study time—were available for participants to use to inform their JOLs. We were only able to obtain effects of perceptual fluency on JOLs when we manipulated fluency within-participants and eliminated item relatedness as a cue for JOLs. The present results indicate that some effects of perceptual fluency on JOLs are not robust and might only occur under limited—and somewhat contrived—conditions. Therefore, these effects might be unlikely to bias students’ JOLs in actual learning situations.

The fluency of retrieval during a test of memory has been implicated as a cue for judgments of learning (JOLs), but little is known about how fluency affects JOLs. In three experiments, we investigated (1) whether the fluency of generation during study may be a cue for JOLs and (2) whether such fluency effects are mediated by an analytic or nonanalytic inference. To accomplish our goals, we used a learner-observer-judge method. While studying paired associates, learners generated some targets at study. For these items, their JOLs were negatively correlated with the time taken to generate targets. Observers watched learners generate targets and then predicted learners' memory performance. Judges also made JOLs but did not watch the learners generate targets. JOLs from all groups were negatively related to learners' latencies to generate targets, with the magnitude of the relationship equivalent for learners and observers and lower for judges. These and other findings are consistent with the conclusions that the fluency of generation at study is a cue for JOLs and that such fluency effects are partly mediated by an analytic inference about how fluency is related to memory.

The perceptual fluency hypothesis claims that items that are easy to perceive at encoding induce an illusion that they will be easier to remember, despite the finding that perception does not generally affect recall. The current set of studies tested the predictions of the perceptual fluency hypothesis with a picture generation manipulation. Participants identified mixed lists of intact images and images whose certain parts were deleted (generate condition) and made predictions about their subsequent memory performance, followed by a recall test. The intact condition always produced higher memory predictions and shorter identification latencies than the generate condition, consistent with the perceptual fluency hypothesis (Experiments 1 to 3). The actual memory performance for generate images was higher than intact images when aggregate judgments of learning (JOLs) were used (Experiment 1) and equivalent to intact images when item-by-item JOLs were used (Experiment 2 to 3). In Experiment 3, introducing a manipulation that facilitates naming latency for generate images did not increase JOL ratings, providing evidence that not all manipulations that facilitate the ease of perception produce higher JOLs. In Experiment 4, the role of a priori beliefs for the picture generation manipulation was assessed through an online questionnaire. Reading a scenario about the manipulation produced no JOL differences for intact and generate images. The results of the 4 experiments reported here are generally consistent with the perceptual fluency hypothesis of metamemory, and are discussed in terms of experience-based and theory-based processes in metamemory judgments and Koriat's (1997) cue utilization framework. (PsycINFO Database Record

Perceptual fluency is generally thought to affect judgments of learning (JOLs) non-analytically. However, some studies suggested that perceptual fluency may also affect JOLs analytically based on beliefs about the relationship between perceptual fluency and memory performance. The present study aimed to investigate how perceptual fluency affects JOLs. In Experiment 1, participants performed a continuous identification task and a JOLs task to determine whether perceptual fluency affects JOLs. In Experiment 2, we manipulated participants’ beliefs about how perceptual fluency affects memory to explore whether perceptual fluency affects JOLs through belief-based analysis. In Experiment 3, we explored whether participants who believed neither perceptual fluency nor font size affected memory performance still offered higher JOLs to large words than to small words, to explore whether perceptual fluency affects JOLs non-analytically. In Experiment 4, participants performed a continuous identification-JOLs task, and then they performed an observation task to measure their beliefs about fluency and memory. The results of the four experiments suggested that perceptual fluency affects JOLs both non-analytically and analytically based on beliefs about the relationship between perceptual fluency and memory performance.

The effects of encoding fluency and retrieval fluency on judgments of learning

According to the principle of inverse effectiveness (PIE), weaker responses to information in one modality (i.e., unisensory) benefit more from additional information in a second modality (i.e., multisensory; Meredith & Stein, 1986). We suggest that the PIE may also inform whether perceptual fluency affects judgments of learning (JOLs). If JOLs follow the PIE, the differences in JOLs for multisensory and unisensory items should increase as the unisensory study items become harder to perceive. That is, an influence of perceptual fluency should prompt a similar, interactive pattern across perceptual responses and JOLs. In 3 experiments, we systematically varied the signal intensity or noise in 1 modality to examine how responses might change with the inclusion of information in a second modality. In Experiment 1, written words in several font sizes were sometimes accompanied by spoken equivalents. In Experiments 2 and 3, spoken words in various background noise levels were sometimes accompanied by visual speech articulations. Consistent with the PIE, the multisensory benefits in response time and/or correct identification increased as responses to unisensory information decreased. Also, the multisensory formats received higher JOLs than the unisensory formats; however, unlike the predictions from PIE, this difference did not increase as study items became harder to perceive. Experiment 3 extended this finding to participants' explicit beliefs. In multisensory settings, JOLs may rely more on theory- than data-driven processes. We suggest that broadly defined processing fluency may always contribute to JOLs, but, regarding perceptual information, JOLs appear to track perceptual attributes rather than perceptual fluency. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Words printed in a larger 48-point font are judged to be more memorable than words printed in a smaller 18-point font, although font size does not affect actual memory. To clarify the basis of this font size effect on metamemory and memory, 4 experiments investigated how presenting words in 48 (Experiment 1) or 4 (Experiments 2 to 4) font sizes between 6 point and 500 point affected judgments of learning (JOLs) and recall performance. Response times in lexical decision tasks were used to measure perceptual fluency. In all experiments, perceptual fluency was lower for words presented in very small and very large font sizes than for words presented in intermediate font sizes. In contrast, JOLs increased monotonically with font size, even beyond the point where a large font impaired perceptual fluency. Assessments of people's metacognitive beliefs about font size revealed that the monotonic increase in JOLs was not due to beliefs masking perceptual fluency effects (Experiment 3). Also, JOLs still increased across the whole range of font sizes when perceptual fluency was made salient at study (Experiment 4). In all experiments but Experiment 4, recall performance increased with increasing font size, although to a lesser extent than JOLs. Overall, the current study supports the idea that metacognitive beliefs underlie font size effects in metamemory. As important, it reveals that people's font size beliefs have some accuracy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

We investigated relationships between psychometric measures of memory, executive functions (EFs), and task-based measures of Judgments of Learning (JOLs) in individuals with and without Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), to study functional reorganization after TBI. We hypothesized that, in controls, accuracy of immediate JOLs would be associated with short-term memory and EFs (but not long-term memory, LTM), while accuracy of delayed JOLs would be associated primarily with LTM. We hypothesized that those with good recovery from TBI would demonstrate functional reorganization of the relationships between memory, EFs, and JOLs. Eighteen individuals with TBI and 18 matched controls completed eight neuropsychological tests of memory and EFs. They studied word-pairs, made immediate and delayed JOLs, and took a cued-recall test for the studied word-pairs. Stepwise regression and Lasso analyses generated a predictive model of JOL accuracy for each group. Accuracy of immediate JOLs in controls was predicted by short-term memory, inhibition, switching, and cognitive fluency, while accuracy of delayed JOLs was predicted by verbal recall. In individuals with TBI, inhibition predicted immediate JOL accuracy and switching predicted delayed JOL accuracy. Cognitive reorganization in those with good long-term recovery from TBI may account for the ability to make JOLs with accuracy similar to controls.

Three experiments tested the hypothesis that people make judgments of learning (JOLs) by attempting to retrieve the target first. If this were the whole story, then the reaction time (RT) functions for making JOLs with no special instructions would parallel those found when people are told to first attempt retrieval and then make a JOL. In the present data, monotonic functions, showing an increase in RT with decreasing JOL, were found when people were instructed to retrieve covertly or overtly and then make a JOL, as would be expected if retrieval fluency entirely determined JOLs. However, the functions for making uninstructed JOLs were different: Low JOLs were made quickly, not slowly, and the curves were inverted U shapes, rather than linear. Furthermore, people's memory performance was somewhat better, especially on low-JOL items, when they were instructed to first retrieve as opposed to when they were told only to make JOLs. To account for these data, we propose a two-stage model of JOLs, with the first stage occurring prior to attempted retrieval.

ABSTRACTAge-related differences in memory monitoring appear when people learn emotional words. Namely, younger adults’ judgments of learning (JOLs) are higher for positive than neutral words, whereas older adults’ JOLs do not discriminate between positive versus neutral words. In two experiments, we evaluated whether this age-related difference extends to learning positive versus neutral pictures. We also evaluated the contribution of two dimensions of emotion that may impact younger and older adults’ JOLs: valence and arousal. Younger and older adults studied pictures that were positive or neutral and either high or low in arousal. Participants made immediate JOLs and completed memory tests. In both experiments, the magnitude of older adults’ JOLs was influenced by emotion, and both younger and older adults demonstrated an emotional salience effect on JOLs. As important, the magnitude of participants’ JOLs was influenced by valence, and not arousal. Emotional salience effects were also evident on participants’ free recall, and older adults recalled as many pictures as did younger adults. Taken together, these data suggest that older adults do not have a monitoring deficit when learning positive (vs. neutral) pictures and that emotional salience effects on younger and older adults’ JOLs are produced more by valence than by arousal.

The font-size effect on judgments of learning: Does it exemplify fluency effects or reflect people’s beliefs about memory?

Previous research has shown that the animacy quality of materials affects basic cognitive processes such as memory (i.e., animate stimuli are remembered better than are inanimate stimuli). This is referred to as the animacy effect. Little research has examined, however, whether this effect can be extended to higher cognitive processes such as metamemory. In the present studies, we investigated the influence of animacy on judgments of learning (JOLs) and the underlying basis of the animacy effect, namely, processing fluency and beliefs about the animacy effect. In Experiment 1, participants studied animate and inanimate words and made immediate JOLs. Results revealed that participants gave higher estimates for animate than they did for inanimate words. In Experiments 2a and 2b, we evaluated the contribution of processing fluency to the animacy effect either by measuring self-paced study time or by disrupting fluency by presenting half of the words in an easy or difficult font style. Results from both experiments indicated that processing fluency contributes minimally to the animacy effect. In questionnaire-based Experiment 3, participants estimated hypothetical participants would better remember the animate words than the inanimate words, suggesting the potential role of beliefs on the animacy effect on JOLs. To conclude, these findings suggest that animacy is a reliable cue when people monitor their learning in higher cognitive processes. The beliefs, not processing fluency, contribute substantially to the animacy effect on JOLs.